We develop a model on the optimal timing of switching from nonrenewable to renewable energy sources with endogenous extraction choices under emission taxes, subsidies on renewable resources and abatement costs. We assume that non-renewable resources are "dirty" inputs and create environmental degradation, while renewable resources are more environmentally friendly, although they may be more or less productive than the exhaustible resources. The value of the switching option from nonrenewable to renewable resources is characterized. Numerical applications show that an increase in emission taxes, abatement costs or demand elasticity slows down the adoption of substitutable renewable resources, while an increase in the natural rate of resource regeneration, the stock of renewable resources or the relative productivity parameter speeds up the investment in the green technology.
Introduction
Today's primary energy sources are mainly non-renewable: natural gas, oil, coal and conventional nuclear power. There are also renewable sources, including biomass, moving water, geothermal, solar, tidal, wind and wave energy. In general, all the various energy sources can contribute to the future energy mix worldwide. But each has its own direct in ‡uence on health, welfare, food security, climate change and other factors in the improvement of living conditions and the quality of life for the world's population.
In terms of pollution risks, natural gas is by far the cleanest of all the fossil fuels, with oil next, and coal is the most polluting one. But they all pose three interrelated pollution problems: global warming, urban industrial air pollution, and acidi…cation of the environment. Some of the wealthier industrial countries may possess the economic capacity to cope with such threats. Most developing countries do not.
On the other side, modern renewable energy systems are estimated to have the technical potential to provide all global energy services in sustainable ways and with low or virtually zero GHG emissions. For example, the total solar energy absorbed by earth's atmosphere, oceans and land masses is approximately 4 Million EJ (exajoules) per year. The amount of solar energy reaching the surface of the planet is so vast that in one year it is about twice as much as will ever be obtained from all of the earth's non-renewable resources of oil, natural gas and mined coal combined. There are some disadvantages, which are linked to the physical properties of natural resources and to the process of converting natural resources into electricity. One limit to the solar energy production is that solar energy is not available at night. Other limits include the reliance on weather patterns to generate electricity and a lack of space for solar cells in areas of high demand, such as cities. Like the production with non-renewable resources, the activity of extracting and converting renewable energies into electricity can be subject to capacity constraints. Indeed, there is a maximum rate at which energy can be extracted from the ‡owing water and this rate is related to the kinetic energy ‡ux in the water turbines. In wind energy production, the Betz Limit states that no wind turbine can convert more than about 60% of the kinetic energy of the wind into mechanical energy turning a rotor 1 . And yet there is an increasing demand for sustainable energy services. The planners of the "2012 International Year of Sustainable Energy for All" 2 have set three main objectives to be achieved in the next twenty years: (i) to ensure access to everyone to sustainable energy (also known as modern energy) services; (ii) to double the rate of improvement in energy e¢ ciency; and (iii) to make 30% of the world's energy renewable. The goal is the development and promotion of strategies, commitments and activities to encourage a programme of switching to alternative renewable and non-polluting energy sources.
The focus of this paper is on the optimal timing of switching from nonrenewable to renewable resources and the role of emission taxes, subsidies on renewable resources and abatement costs. We assume that non-renewable resources are "dirty" inputs and create environmental degradation, while renewable resources are more environmentally friendly, although they may be more or less productive than the exhaustible resources. The setup is a real option model where the optimal extraction rates of renewable and non-renewable natural resources are determined by solving the …rm's pro…t maximization under emission taxes and abatement costs. Our work endogenously takes into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the renewable resource. The …rm solves an optimal stopping problem in order to …nd the critical threshold of switching from an exhaustible polluting input to a low carbon renewable resource. Closed form solutions for the optimal switching timing and the value of the option to switch, are found. Our numerical applications show that an increase in emission taxes, abatement costs or demand elasticity slows down the adoption of alternative renewable resources, while an increase in the natural rate of resource regeneration, the stock of the renewable resource or the relative e¢ ciency parameter speeds up the investment in the green …rm.
Our paper improves on the current literature in several dimensions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper where the emission tax rate, subsidies on low carbon renewable resources and the cost of carbon abatement are embedded in a real option framework about the timing of switching to renewable resources. Moreover, in our model the renewable resource can be more or less e¢ cient than the non-renewable resource. This feature is most relevant in practical applications. In electricity generation an electric generator is a device that converts energy inputs into electrical energy. Converting fossil fuels into electricity can be more or less e¢ cient than converting renewable inputs into electricity. For example, converting biomass into electricity is less e¢ cient than converting oil into electricity (see Mosiño, 2012) , while, depending on the water turbines, converting hydro energies into electricity can be more or less e¢ cient then converting fossil fuels into electricity. In general, large hydro power stations are by far the most e¢ cient method of large scale electric power generation. Our main results suggest that the option to switch will be exercised, depending on values of the unit abatement cost and on the relative productivity parameter. The data used for the numerical applications are in keeping with the empirical evidence and show that our results are robust to the modelling and to various relevant parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 describes the setup of the model and characterizes the case when the energy producer uses a non-renewable resource (Proposition 1) or a renewable resource (Proposition 2). Section 4 solves the optimal stopping problem of the energy producer and …nds the value of the switching option and the optimal switching time (Proposition 3). Numerical results are presented in Section 5. In particular, a detailed sensitivity analysis is shown as to deepen our understanding of the e¤ects of emission taxes, unit abatement costs, natural resource regeneration rates and the stock of renewable resources on the optimal timing of switching from non-renewable to renewable resources and on the …rm's value. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature review
There have been many studies on e¤ective policy solutions to environmental degradation based on approaches that di¤er from the present paper. Acemoglu et al. (2012) develop a two-sector model of directed technical change to study the e¤ects of environmental policies on di¤erent types of technologies. The unique …nal good is produced by combining the inputs produced by the two sectors (clean and dirty inputs). They characterize the structure of equilibria and the dynamic tax/subsidy policies that achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertemporal welfare. Their main results focus on the types of policies that can prevent environmental disasters, the structure of optimal environmental regulation and its long-run growth implications, and the costs of delay in implementing environmental regulation. In particular, they show that without intervention, the economy would rapidly head towards an environmental disaster, while the use of carbon taxes or research subsidies would be su¢ cient to (re)direct technical change toward the clean sector and avoid environmental disasters. Chakravorty et al. (2012) study how environmental policy in the form of a cap on aggregate emissions from a fossil fuel interacts with the arrival of a clean substitute (e.g., solar energy). They show that the price of energy under such a target may exhibit cyclical trends driven by scarcity of the nonrenewable resource, the e¤ect of environmental constraints and potential cost reductions in the clean technology. The seminal work by Heal (1974, 1979) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981) examine the e¤ects of economic and technological uncertainties on the dynamics of non-renewable resource depletion. Pindyck (1980) studies the e¤ects of two sources of uncertainty (of the future demand and the resource reserves) on the market-price evolution, the optimality of the competitive market and the value of exploration. Pindyck (1984) examines the implication of ecological uncertainty on the optimal extraction rate of a renewable resource. In Pindyck (2000 Pindyck ( , 2002 ) the e¤ects of irreversibilities and uncertainties on the optimal timing of adoption of policies for emission reductions are analyzed.
Our paper employs real option methodology. There are important reasons to use real options when dealing with the choice of policy options for emission reductions. Some papers have employed a cost-bene…t analysis, where the social planner maximizes expected bene…ts from some policy to calculate the optimal level of current abatement of greenhouse gases, and hence the current social cost of carbon. However, as pointed out by Pindyck (2000 Pindyck ( , 2002 , standard cost-bene…t analysis fails to simultaneously capture the irreversibilities and uncertainties about climate change and environmental policy intervention. Real options are also the appropriate methodology to incorporate the role of timing in adoption of alternative renewable energies. Recently, a number of studies in the real options literature have examined the implications of irreversibility and uncertainty for the optimal timing problem in environmental economics in different contexts (see, for example, Conrad, 1997 Sereno, 2011, 2012) . However, none of them deal with the case of non-renewable vs renewable resources.
In our paper we study the e¤ects of emission taxes, subsidies on renewable resources and abatement costs as instruments to accelerate the switching to renewable and clean resources. Also other papers have dealt with the impact of environmental taxes, although in a di¤erent context. Van Soest (2005) analyzes the impact of environmental taxes and quotas on the timing of adoption of energy-saving technologies under irreversibility and stochastic arrival rate of the new technologies, and shows that: (i) increased environmental stringency (measured in tax and its equivalent in terms of quota) does not necessarily induce early adoption, and (ii) there is no unambiguous ranking of policy instruments in terms of the length of the adoption lag. While Van Soest (2005) studies the investment decisions of a single …rm under environmental regulations that impose sunk costs on the …rm, we consider two types of …rms: one uses a dirty exhaustible resource and the other uses a low carbon renewable resource and we characterize the optimal timing to adopt the renewable resource in a setting with emission taxes and abatement costs. In Van Soest (2005) innovation is driven by an exogenous jump process, while in our model market demand is stochastic. Sereno (2011, 2012 ) study the e¤ects of alternative environmental policy options for the reduction of pollution emissions. Their models endogenously take into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the new environmental policy. The level of emissions is determined by solving the …rm's pro…t maximization problem under taxes, standards and permits. They …nd rankings for the adoption of environmental policies in a setting characterized by economic and ecological uncertainties and ambiguity over future costs and bene…ts over adopting environmental policies. Our model is not concerned with the regulator's behavior about the timing of policy for emission reductions but analyzes the response of …rm's investment decisions to changes in environmental regulation, cost of abatement, exhaustibility of resources and the relative e¢ ciency of the energy generators.
Our paper is mainly related to Mosiño (2012) who …rstly studies the determinants of switching from non-renewable natural resources to renewable resources in a real option framework. In Mosiño (2012) the stock of both resources is stochastic. In particular, the stock of a renewable resource follows a geometric Brownian motion and the resource's self regeneration function (i.e. the drift component of the process) is a modi…ed version of the logistic equation proposed by P.F. Verhulst in 1838. Since there is no closed form solution for the optimal switching time and the value of the option to switch he provides a numerical solution using the projection method. Di¤erently from Mosiño (2012) we develop a model of optimal timing to switch to renewable energy sources with endogenous extraction choices under emission taxes, subsidies and abatement costs.
In our model the stock of a renewable resource regenerates naturally following the same di¤erential equation used by Acemoglu et al. (2012) for the modelling of the environmental quality. This seems particularly adequate when valuing investment in hydropower plant where a reservoir is slowly replenished or forest biomass where it takes many years for the forest to redevelop. Moreover, this allows us to …nd a closed form solution for the optimal switching timing and the value of the option to switch. In Mosiño (2012) only renewable resources that are less e¢ cient than fossil fuel are considered, while we consider also the case of renewable resources which are more e¢ cient than fossil fuels.
Taschini and Urech (2010) develop a model of real options to evaluate the value of a generation system consisting of a coal-…red and a gas-…red power plant in the presence of expected windfall pro…ts under the EU Emission Trading Scheme, but are not concerned with timing issues. Siddiqui et al. (2007) , Siddiqui and Fleten (2010) , and Davis and Owens (2003) consider investment in renewable energy R&D and deployment of the new technology using real options. These papers focus on technologies requiring costly R&D and staged commercialization, but, in comparison to our paper, do not deal with polluting emissions and various policy interventions. Finally, our model is also related to Ghoddusi (2010) who studies the option to expand the capacity of a plant under capacity constraints. However, he does not consider the option to switch to a low carbon renewable resource.
The model
Suppose that the …rm is currently using a non-renewable source to produce energy but has the option to switch to a renewable (perfect substitute) input. Switching is available at a …xed and irreversible cost I > 0: We suppose that, once the irreversible investment is undertaken, there is no incentive to turn back to the use of the non-renewable resources. For example, once the oil platform decides to become a wind farm, almost all of the previously installed capital needs to be dismantled, and very few parts of the old facility can be reutilized. 3 The renewable resource can be more or less productive than the fossil fuel. However, the non-renewable energy source is "dirty", while the renewable resource is cleaner, or more environmentally friendly.
In the next subsections we …rst describe the model and develop the programmes to be solved by the …rm when using the non-renewable resource as an input without switching (Section 3.1) or assuming that it already switched to the renewable resource (Section 3.2). Then in Section 4 we analyze the problem when the switching opportunity is taken into account.
Non-renewable and dirty energy sources
A risk-neutral …rm is endowed with a deposit of exhaustible natural resources. At time t the …rm is assumed to extract q 1;t units of the natural resource to produce E t units of energy according to the following production function:
where 1;t is the ‡ow of GHG emissions related to the activity of energy production 4 and a 1 is the the parameter that re ‡ects the e¢ ciency of power plants to convert a fuel into electricity. 5 No uncertainty is assumed regarding the resources and no exploration costs, therefore the dynamics of resource depletion is given by:
where R 1;0 (> 0) is the initial stock of fuel and R 1;t is the residual stock at any time t. There is no storage, so all extracted fuel is instantly used to produce energy. The spot price of energy at time t is a function of the instantaneous rate of energy production, E t and an exogenously given random process X t :
Extraction costs are assumed to be negligible, which is a realistic assumption (see for example Ghoddusi, 2010 p. 363). Finally, we assume that the level of emission ‡ow 1;t can be reduced by setting an emission tax rate ( ) which must be paid for each unit of carbon emitted. Therefore the instantaneous pro…t rate is determined by:
In order to analyze the behavior of the energy producer, we need to specify a functional form for the inverse demand function and the dynamics of the demand shock. We consider the case where the demand is of a constant elasticity type, P t = X t E t , (0 < < 1 is the elasticity of market demand) and the stochastic demand parameter X t follows a geometric Brownian motion with the following dynamics:
4 As in Ono (2002) , let us start with a production function of the form: Et = zta 1 q 1;t , where zt is the intensity of pollution. The activity of energy production leads to a ‡ow of environmentally harmful emissions 1;t = Etz t ; where > 0 is constant. Elimination of zt between the production function and the emission production function leads to (1), i.e. we denote = where and are the drift and volatility parameters of the demand process and dZ is an increment to a Wiener process. In particular, reasons for demand ‡uctuations may be due for example to variations in the price of substitute products, climate change, technology improvements, etc. 6 Throughout, we assume that:
where r > 0 is the discount rate. This condition guarantees that the problem is bounded. 7 The objective of the energy producer is to choose the optimal rate of extraction q 1;t and emission 1;t to produce E t units of energy such that the expected net present value of the future pro…t streams from energy production is maximized:
subject to Eq. (2) for the evolution of the resource depletion and (3) for the evolution of demand shock X t .
The following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 When the …rm uses the non-renewable resource forever, the optimal resource extraction rate is a linear function of the remaining reserves, that is, q 1 = q 1;t = R 1;t r , and the reserves evolve as follows:
Moreover, the optimal level of emissions is 1 (q 1 ) =
is the operating pro…t that can be obtained from an additional unit of the non-renewable resource extracted, processed and sold as energy, and = 1 (1 ).
Proof. of Proposition 1: In the Appendix.
It is bene…cial to compare our result with the results in the literature on the optimal extraction of non-renewable resources. In this literature the wellknown Hotelling rule suggests that in the absence of pollution emissions (i.e., 6 It is well-known that the price of electricity is best modelled using complex stochastic processes exhibiting mean-reverting paths with jumps (see for instance Lucia and Schwartz, 2002; Cartea and Figueroa, 2005 and Geman and Roncoroni, 2006 ) and a geometric Brownian motion is a simpli…cation. However, the choice described here is a long-run investment decision and the geometric Brownian motion assumption seems an adequate approximation for the long-term price process (see for instance Schwartz and Smith, 2000) . 7 See the discussion in Section 4. = 0), emission taxes (i.e. = 0) and production costs, the marginal revenue of the …rm will grow with the interest rate 8 , yielding q 1;t = r R 1;t , and
Thus, the optimal extraction rate is a linear function of the remaining stock and declines exponentially. Pindyck (1980) shows that even with stochastic demand shocks, the basic Hotelling rule for the expectation of marginal revenue holds. Using dX t = X t dt + X t dZ t , straightforward calculations yield q 1;t = r R 1;t , and again the optimal extraction rate is a linear function of the remaining reserves and declines exponentially 9 . Substituting the optimal extraction rate into …rm's pro…t we obtain, 1 (
; in the absence of environmental regulation and pollution emissions.
Proposition 1 shows that the optimal extraction rate is always a linear function of the remaining reserves and declines exponentially. Initially, at t = 0 the extraction rate q 1;0 = R 1;0 r is less than the extraction rate q 1;0 = R 1;0 r that is obtained in the Pindyck's model in the absence of emissions, taxes and extraction cost. The reason is that the environmental regulation a¤ects …rm's production through a reduction of …rm's emissions and pro…t ‡ows. However, as t increases the optimal extraction rate q 1;t = R 1;t r increases above the extraction rate obtained in the Pindyck's model in the absence of emissions since the depletion rate e r t is greater than the depletion rate e r t for any 0 < < 1: Hence, the impact of an emission tax is to ‡atten the extraction path of fossil fuels. We illustrate the e¤ect of the environmental policy on the stock of natural resource in the following numerical example.
Numerical Example 1. Using these results, one can calculate the time it takes for a producer with a given reserve R 1;0 to exhaust its resources. Let us assume: R 1;0 = 100 Billions (reserves of crude oil in barrels), 10 r = 0:05 (risk-free interest rate); = 0:01 (drift-rate of demand shock); = 0:25 (energy elasticity of emissions); = 0:5 (elasticity of market demand): We have 8 The derivation of this result can be found in the Appendix. 9 Using dXt = Xtdt + XtdZt,
Accordingly,
Straightforward calculations yield:
1 (1 ) = 1 0:25 (1 0:5) = 0:875: Since the extraction rate is a linear function of the remaining reserves and declines exponentially, the nonrenewable resource (R 1;t ) will be truly exhausted only in in…nite time. Thus, to make comparisons, we assume that the resource is (practically) exhausted when the stock of reserve reaches a negligible level, say 1 (measured in oil barrels). This is not a particularly strong assumption and ensures that the resource is exhausted in …nite time. Hence: Hence, in the absence of emissions and taxes the resource will exhaust 58 years earlier.
Production with renewable resources
Suppose that the …rm has access to a renewable (perfect substitute) input. The renewable resource can be more or less productive than the fossil fuel. Let a 2 be the parameter of e¢ ciency of generators using hydro, solar, or wind energy. We assume that a 2 = a 1 , where the energy e¢ ciency factor is such that 0 < < 1 if the renewable resource is less productive than the fossil fuel, while > 1 if the renewable resource is more productive.
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Denote by 2;t the ‡ow of emissions related to the renewable energy production. Unlike fossil fuel technologies, the vast majority of GHG emissions from renewable energies occur upstream of the plant operation, typically for the production and construction of the technology and its supporting infrastructure. 12 For biomass power plants the majority of emissions can arise during the fuelcycle depending on the choice of biomass fuel. Also for hydroelectric reservoirs a huge amount of gases is released when the water is passing the turbine and the spillway. Hence, the production function is: As we can see from the graph at page 13 the e¢ ciency in converting oil into electricity may be up to 44%, while the e¢ ciency of a biomass may be up to 40%. 1 2 For most renewable energy technologies upstream GHG emissions can account for over 90% of cumulative emissions. See the International Atomic Energy Agency's report, available at: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/GHG_manuscript_pre-print_versionDanielWeisser.pdf .
Here, we assume that 2;t < 1;t since renewable energy does not produce toxins or pollutants that are harmful to the environment in the same manner that non-renewable energy does. 13 To manage this emission, the …rm installs an abatement technology. The total cost of abatement can be described as c 2;t where c is the exogenous unit abatement cost. 14 As for the non-renewable resource case, we assume that the stock of the renewable natural resource, R 2 , is deterministic, but now evolves according to the di¤erential equation:
where R 2;0 (> 0) is the initial stock of renewable resources, R 2;t is the residual stock at any time t, (> 0) is the rate of the resource regeneration and (> 0) is the rate of decrease of the resource stock due to the activity of extraction q 2;t . 15 Since there is no storage in this version of model, the spot price of energy 1 3 A comparison of GHG emissions for various energy generating technology (i.e. nuclear, fossil and renewables) can be found in Frans H. Koch (2002) "Hydropower -Internalised costs and externalised bene…ts", available at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/reports/2002/nea3676-externalities.pdf#page=131. Table 1 shows the emissions produced by 1 kWh of electricity based on life cycle analysis. The amount of noxious emissions (i.e., SO2, NOx, etc.) and greenhouse gas emissions are much smaller for hydropower, nuclear, and wind, than they are for fossil fuels. 1 4 In our model …rms with renewable resources are the only ones engaging in abatement because our objective is to study the timing of switching from dirty and non-renewable resources to less polluting and renewable resource. This will allow us to get 2;t < 1;t which is in keeping with the empirical evidence (see Sims et al. 2003 ). Alternatively, we can consider both …rms engaging in abatement activities. The unit abatement costs in this case are c 1 and c 2 where c 1 < c 2 : However, this does not change our results substantially. Hence, we avoid to make this assumption for an easier exposition. 1 5 A similar process is used by Acemoglu et al. (2012) to describe the dynamics of environmental quality. In particular, let St be the quality of environment which evolves according to the di¤erence equation:
St where measures the rate of environmental degradation resulting from the production of dirty input Y dt and > 0 is the rate of environmental regeneration. Our framework is related to Mosiño (2012) . However, in his model a stochastic logistic growth function is proposed:
where K is the carry capacity or the saturation level of the resource. In particular, it is shown that there exists a maximum sustained yield MSY at q M SY = max
with the property that any larger harvest rate will lead to the depletion of the resource. As noted by the author such processes are very appropriate in the case of biomass energy. In our model we adopt a deterministic dynamics for the renewable resource depletion and assume that the growth/regeneration rate is simply ; instead of the more complex logistic version. It seems to us that this model is more general and well …ts the property of renewable energy inputs such as hydropower where the production of energy depends on moving water into reservoir and where the risk of resource extinction is negligible. This might also be true for forest biomass where it takes many years for the forest to redevelop, but it seems less appropriate for other prevalent renewable sources such as solar, wind, or nuclear that act less like a stock and more like a ‡ow. A more generalizable form would be to allow the rate of decrease in Eq. (4) to go to zero for the case of a renewable resource ‡ow. In this case the available amount of the renewable would be R 2;t .
is:
where X t is the same geometric Brownian motion as Eq. (3). We assume that extraction costs of the renewable resource equal zero (see Mosiño, 2012) and that the …rm pays the emission tax rate for each unit of pollutant emitted. Therefore the …rm's pro…t rate is:
As usual:
to guarantee that the problem is bounded. The objective of the energy producer is to choose the optimal levels of emission 2;t and extraction q 2;t of the renewable natural resource to produce E t units of energy such that the expected net present value of the future pro…t streams from energy production is maximized:
; ; s:t: :
Following the same argument of the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When the …rm uses the renewable resource forever, the optimal resource extraction rate is a linear function of the remaining reserves, that is, q 2 = r ( ) R 2;t , and the reserves evolve as follows R 2;t = R 2;0 e r t :
Moreover, the optimal level of emissions is 2 (q 2 ) =
is the operating pro…t that can be obtained from an additional unit of the renewable resource extracted, processed and sold as energy and where ' = Proof. of Proposition 2: In the Appendix.
Notice that in this case the depletion factor e r t is greater than the factor e r t that is obtained when the …rm uses a non-renewable input. Since the natural resource regenerates continuously over time, the …rm can extract more input than if the resource depletes over time without regenerating naturally.
Renewable resources are continuously available, unlike non-renewable resources which depletes over time. A simple comparison is an oil reserve and a hydroelectric plant. The quantity of water into a reservoir can be used up but, if carefully managed, it represents a continuous source of energy, contrarily to the oil reserve which, once it has been exhausted, is gone. Let us consider the following numerical experiment.
Numerical Example 2. Let us assume: R 2;0 = 105 Billions (reserves of water in a reservoir in barrels), 16 r = 0:05 (risk-free interest rate); = 0:01 (drift-rate of demand shock); = 0:25 (energy elasticity of emissions), = 0:5 (elasticity of market demand), = 0:038 (rate of replenishment of water into reservoir 17 ). We compute = 1
(1 ) = 1 0:25 (1 0:5) = 0:875: We obtain the time it takes for a producer with a given reserve R 2;0 to reach the exhaustion of the resource: The quantity of water in the reservoir will take about 25:328 years to be exhausted given the initial stock level R 2;0 = 105 Billions and = 0:038. Moreover, note that if the current replenishment rate would be = 0:0385714, the residual stock at time t = 1:000:000 (given t = 0 i.e., 14/06/2013) is: The remaining stock after 1 million years is about as its initial stock level at 14/06/2013.
resource to a renewable resource and characterize the determinants of the optimal switching time .
We …rst compute the value of the "dirty …rm" at t = 0 when the possibility of switching to a lower emission renewable input is not available:
In the same way, we can compute the value of the "green …rm" at t = 0 after the switching to a lower emission renewable input: 2 . 18 Notice that we make two economically natural assumptions which ensure convergence of the above integral: r , 19 which guarantees the integrability of the present value of the extraction rates q 1;t and q 2;t ; and r 2 > 0: 1 9 This ensures that the stock of natural resources decreases over time. We can also assume r = which means that the stock of renewable resources is inexhaustible (constant over time) as for the case of the reserves of water in a reservoir. See the numerical example 2 and the numerical application for more intuitions.
2 0 The intuition for this condition is as follows. Applying Itô's Lemma, we …nd that Yt = X 1 t follows the geometric Brownian motion:
For convergence of the expected present value of Yt the discount rate must exceed the trend growth rate of Yt (no-bubble condition). Hence, r Since we assume that the level of emissions ‡ow 2 (q 2 ) is less than 1 (q 1 ) we require that:
where ' = 
The optimal stopping problem
The objective of the energy producer is to choose the optimal timing of switching to a lower emission renewable resource such that the expected net present value function of the di¤erence between the pro…t stream (X t ; E t ) and the switching cost I, is maximized:
subject to Eq. (3) for the evolution of demand shock X t and to Eqs. (2) and (4) for the evolution of the natural resource depletions. Here, T is the class of admissible implementation times conditional to the …ltration generated by the stochastic process X t : Here, (X t ; E t ) = X 1 t (a 1 q 1 )
To simplify the notation, let us set = 1, which does not change our results substantially. Applying the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) methodology, we can derive the optimal timing of switching to a lower emission renewable resource. In particular, we can compute the critical thresholdX, such that it is optimal to switch for X >X. We obtain Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 If the relative e¢ ciency parameter is su¢ ciently large and for some appropriate values of the unit cost of abatement, the …rm will switch from non-renewable resources to renewable resources as soon as X >X, wherê X = If > , where:
( ) then 0 < c < c < c . These parameter restrictions on c and ensure that the critical switching threshold and the value of the option to switch are positive, meaning that it will be optimal to exercise the option to switch at the critical thresholdX. Otherwise, the option to switch SW O will never be exercised and will expire worthless. Proposition 3 gives us a policy indication. If the goal of the government is to provide incentives towards switching to alternative renewable and non-polluting energy sources, then it should subsidize the cost of abatement and increase the productivity of the renewable resource (for example, relying on research and innovation subsidies). However, such subsidies for the renewable energy with the intention of encouraging substitution away from fossil fuels may accentuate climate change damages, by increasing …rm's emissions. Such an outcome has been termed a "Green Paradox" (see Sinn, 2008) . Some recent papers have addressed this issue in a framework that di¤ers from our model. Whether a subsidy results in greater environmental damage (i.e. a "Green Paradox") or not, depends on the relationship among parameters a¤ecting the time pro…le of the returns to investments in the substitute and the costs 21 . In our model such a paradox does not occur since the subsidy has no e¤ect on the time path of extraction of the fossil fuel resources, but on the emissions of the clean …rm. Moreover, as it is shown in Section 3.1 the tax works as intended, because it extends the extraction period. Finally, at the switching time the non-renewable resource stock is not exhausted, in contrast with most models where the paradox arises.
A further policy intervention refers to the parameter I , that is, the cost of investment in the green technology. The regulator can provide switching incentives by decreasing I through a subsidy s, where s is a fraction of the revenues generated by the pollution taxes. We can substitute I 0 = I s in the formulas above. It is immediate to show that: (i) the critical switching threshold X is decreasing in s, (ii) the value of the option SW O is increasing in s and (iii) the level of emissions is neutral to such an environmental policy option. Regulators caring about global warming damages might prefer such a policy, which outperforms a policy of subsidizing the cost of abatement or increasing the productivity of the generators, since it does not a¤ect total emissions.
In the next section we study the impact of the relevant parameters on the critical thresholdX above which it is optimal to switch to the renewable and environmentally friendly resource.
Numerical application
In this section we provide some numerical results and sensitivity analysis for the optimal threshold of switching from a non-renewable resource to a renewable resource. Base case parameters used for the computation of the optimal switching time and the value of the switching option are illustrated as follows.
Energy E¢ ciency of Generators. One measure of the e¢ ciency of power plants that convert a fossil fuel into electricity is the heat rate, which is the amount of energy used by a power plant to generate one kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity. The lower the heat rate, the more e¢ cient the plant. A comparison of the e¢ ciency of di¤erent types of power plants (i.e. coal, natural gas and oil) is provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 22 EIA expresses heat rates in British thermal units (Btu) per net kWh generated. To express the e¢ ciency of a generator or power plant as a percentage, EIA divides the equivalent Btu content of a kWh of electricity (which is 3,412 Btu) by the 2 1 Grafton et al. (2012) show that subsidies for renewable resources with the intention of encouraging substitution of biofuels to fossil fuels may accentuate climate change damages by hastening fossil fuel extraction in some cases, and provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the Green Paradox to hold. Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012) provide examples where following an increase in the subsidy of the clean renewable resource (i) welfare increases, if it is optimal to leave some of the fossil fuels reserves unexploited, or (ii) welfare decreases, if fossil fuel is fully exhausted in …nite time. 2 heat rate. For example, if the heat rate is 10,140 Btu, the e¢ ciency is 34%; if the heat rate is 7,500 Btu, the e¢ ciency is 45%. 23 In general, the best fossil fuel plants are only about 60 percent e¢ cient. Unfortunately, the EIA does not have estimates for the e¢ ciency of generators using hydro, solar, and wind energy. Hence, we use estimates from the Union of the Electricity Industry-Eurelectric. 24 Hydroelectric power generation is by far the most e¢ cient method of large scale electric power generation. The conversion e¢ ciency of a hydroelectric power plant depends mainly on the type of water turbine employed and can be up to 95% for large plants. Smaller plants with output powers less than 5 MW may have e¢ ciencies between 80 and 85 %. In the following simulations we assume a 1 = 0:5 (e¢ ciency of the fossil fuel power plant) and a 2 = 0:9 (e¢ ciency of a hydroelectric power plant). Therefore the e¢ ciency of renewables relative to non-renewables, a2 a1 = 1:8: Parameters related to the installed capacity of the green …rm. As for the previous numerical examples we assume that the reserves of crude oil is R 1;0 = 100 10 9 barrels. 25 Moreover, we assume that the reserves of water in a reservoir is R 2;0 = 105 10 9 barrels. 26 The Investment costs of large (>10 MWe) hydropower plants range from $1750/kWe to $6250/kWe, with an average investment cost of $4000/kWe US$. The investment costs of small (1-10 MWe) and very small ( 1 MWe) hydro power plants may range from $2000 to $7500/kWe and from $2500 to $10,000/kWe, respectively, with indicative, average investment costs of $4500/kWe and $5000/kWe. 27 Assuming 432 MWe of generating capacity, 28 we have I = 2 10 9 ; that is the cost of installment of the hydropower plant in Euros. Fig. 1 shows a typical hydroelectric power plant diagram. 2 3 Source: http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=107&t=3. 2 4 See also footnote 10. 2 5 A barrel of oil is 42 US gallons or 160 liters. A cubic meter is 1000 liters. Hence, 1000/160 = 6.25 barrels/m 3 : In the numerical simulations below we use a ‡uid barrel as unit of volume where a ‡uid barrel is 119 liters. Implementing a straightforward conversion we obtain R 1;0 = 134 10 9 in unit of ‡uid barrel. 2 6 This is approximately 12.5 km 3 of water. For this calculation a ‡uid barrel as unit of volume is used. In the US a ‡uid barrel is 31.5 US gallons or 119 liters. 1 cubic metre is equivalent to 1000 liters. Hence, 1000/119 = 8.4 barrels/m 3 : Using this value we obtain the initial stock of renewable natural resource, that is, R 2;0 = 8:4 125 10 8 = 105 10 9 barrels: 2 7 Souce International Energy Agency (IEA): http://www.iea-etsap.org/web/ETechDS/PDF/E07-hydropower-GS-gct.pdf. 2 8 For example this the installed capacity of the Gordon Dam which consists of 3 144 MWe turbines.
Hydroelectric power plant diagram.
Remaining parameter values. The other parameter values are assumed as follows: r = 0:05 (risk-free interest rate); = 0:01 (drift-rate of demand shock); = 0:25 (energy elasticity of emissions); = 0:5 (elasticity of market demand), = 0:037 (rate of replenishment of water into reservoir), = 0:2 (emission tax rate), = 0:3 (volatility of the demand shock), = 1 (rate of decrease of the resource stock due to the activity of extraction) and X = 1 (initial level of the shock of the market demand). Let us assume a unit abatement cost of 40e per tCO 2 e (ton of Carbon Dioxide equivalent). It is also in keeping with some empirical evidence, where the cost of abating emissions may rise up to 40 Euros per tCO 2 e. To compare the unit abatement cost with the emission tax rate we express c as a percentage, and we assume c = 0:4 in the following numerical simulations. We can compute the critical level of the non-renewable resource at which the marginal value function with a non-renewable resource is equal to the marginal value function with a renewable resource, we obtain: 17:7 10 9 barrels. 29 Any additional unit of resource extracted, processed and sold as energy will reduce the marginal value function with a non-renewable resource (dashed curve) below the marginal value function with a substitute renewable resource (solid curve) as shown in Figure 1 below.
[Insert Figure 1 here] Figure 2 shows the relation between the value function, J N , the the value of reward, J S I and the shock of market demand X: The dashed curve refers to the value function in the no-switching region (or value of continuation) while the solid curve refers to the value function in the switching region minus the cost of installment of the hydropower plant (value of reward or value of termination). We consider values of the shock of market demand X ranging from 0 to 20000: The critical thresholdX is found at the point of tangency of J N with the curve J S I: We foundX ' 9948:4. For values of the shock of market demand belonging to the interval (0; 9948:4) the renewable resource should not be adopted, while for values of X greater than 9948:4 the renewable resource should be immediately adopted. At the optimal adoption threshold, the value of the option to switch, 1 X 1 ; is about 6:18476 10 9 e. As R 2;0 increases (and so the value of the hydropower plant) the value functions before the switch and after the switch increase (the curves shift upwards); the dynamics are illustrated thoroughly in Figure 3 below.
[Insert Figure 2 about here] Figure 3 shows the relation between the critical switching thresholdX and the initial stock of the renewable resource R 2;0 . We consider values of R 2;0 ranging from 0 to 700 10 10 barrels of water: The critical switching threshold is downward sloping with respect to the initial stock of renewable natural resource R 2;0 : The reason is that a higher R 2;0 will increase both the …rm's extraction rate and the pro…ts rate. Moreover, a higher stock of renewable resource will increase the value of the option to switch and hence speed up the investment in the hydropower plant. Let us consider the following numerical example. Let us assume that the initial stock of resource is R 2;0 = 55 10 9 barrels of water. At this level of the stock of renewable resource the critical switching threshold isX = 12678:3; the value of option to switch is 3852:34e, the value function before the switch J N = 37880e and J S I = 1:9998 10 9 e. Now, let us assume that the stock of renewable resource R 2;0 increase from 55 10 9 to 105 10 9 barrels of water. For example let us assume that the energy producer chooses a greater hydropower plant, i.e. a greater dam with a larger reservoir. With this new level of the stock of the renewable resource the critical switching threshold decreases from 12678:3 to about 9948:4, the value of the option to switch increases to 5559e, also the value functions J N and J S I increase, to 50452:9 and 1:9997 10 9 e, respectively.
[Insert Figure 3 about here] Figure 4 shows the relation between the critical switching thresholdX and the abatement cost c. We consider values of c ranging from 0 to 1: The critical switching threshold is upward sloping with respect to the abatement cost c: The reason is that a higher c reduces …rm's pro…ts and thus necessitates a higher X for the investment in the hydropower system to take place. The intuition is as follows. The optimal switching time is de…ned as that level of X at which the value function before the switch and the value function after the switch are equivalent. Evaluating both values atX and increasing the cost of carbon abatement, decreases both the value function before the switch and the value function after the switch (the curves in Figure 2 shift downward) . On one hand, a larger c would reduce the pro…ts of the hydropower farm (through a reduction in the level of emission ‡ow), while render the dirty …rm more pro…table (the value function before the switch increases while the value function after the switch decreases). On the other hand, the value of the option to switch decreases because there is less incentive to switch to renewable resources since the pro…ts of the green …rm decrease (the value function before the switch decreases). Thus, the …nal e¤ect on the timing to switch depends on which e¤ect is the strongest. Overall, the e¤ect on the green …rm seems to dominate. That means that when faced with a higher cost of abatement, the value of continuation is greater than the value of termination, and hence the producer will decide to wait longer for adopting the more environmental-friendly renewable technology.
[Insert Figure 4 about here] Figure 5 shows the relation between the critical switching thresholdX and the rate of the renewable resource regeneration . We consider values of ranging from 0:01 to 0:0385714: This value is chosen so as to have the depletion term e r t very close to zero. 30 This guarantees that the renewable resource never depletes over time. The critical switching threshold is downward sloping with respect to rate of resource regeneration . The intuition is as follows. As increases the renewable resource becomes more inexhaustible and thus increases the value of the hydropower plant (through a decrease in the discount term ( ) ); also the value of the option to switch to the renewable resource increases since there is more incentive to adopt an inexhaustible natural resource. Both the value function before the switch and the value function after the switch increase (the curves in Figure 2 shift upwards) . Thus, the …nal e¤ect on the timing to switch depends on which e¤ect is the strongest. Overall, the e¤ect on the value of the clean …rm seems to dominate. That means that when faced with a higher rate of resource regeneration, the value of continuation is lower than the value of termination, and hence the producer will decide to hasten the adoption of the environmental-friendly renewable technology.
[Insert Figure 5 about here] Figure 6 shows the relation between the critical switching thresholdX and the emission tax rate . We consider values of the emission tax rate ranging from about 0:2 to 1: The critical switching threshold is upward sloping with respect to : The reason is that a higher reduces …rm's pro…ts and thus necessitates a higher X for the investment in the hydropower plant to take place. The intuition is as follows. The optimal adoption time is de…ned as that level of X at which the continuation and the termination values are equal. Evaluating both values atX and increasing the level of stringency of environmental policy, decreases both the value function before the switch and the value function after the switch (the curves in Figure 2 shift downwards). Indeed, a larger would reduce the emissions and pro…ts of both types of …rms. The value of the option to switch both decreases and increases. On one hand, the value of the option to switch decreases because there is less incentive to switch to renewable resources since the pro…ts of a green …rm decrease; on the other hand, there is more incentive to switch to a renewable resource since the pro…ts of a dirty …rm decrease. Thus, the …nal e¤ect on the timing to switch depends on which e¤ect is the strongest. Overall, the e¤ect on the green …rm seems to dominate. That means that when faced with a more stringent environmental policy, the value function before the switch is larger than the value function after the switch, and hence the producer will decide to wait longer for adopting the more environmental-friendly renewable technology.
The result that the more stringent the policy, the more the …rm delays the adoption of lower emission technologies, was also highlighted in Van Soest (2005), however, using a di¤erent model with a di¤erent objective function. Also Agliardi and Sereno (2011) obtain the same sensitivity results with respect to the stringency of environmental policy, although they consider a di¤erent problem of regulator's behavior with alternative environmental policy options and the …nance requirements of the environmental protection. Figure 7 shows the relation between the critical switching thresholdX and the relative e¢ ciency parameter . We consider values of the relative e¢ ciency parameter ranging from 0 to 2:5: The critical switching threshold is downward sloping with respect to : The reason is that a higher increases the pro…ts of a green …rm and thus necessitates a lower X for the investment in the hydropower plant to take place. The intuition is as follows. As increases the generator using a renewable resource becomes more e¢ cient in converting that resource into electrical energy than the generator converting fuels into electrical energy. Thus, an increase in increases both the value of the hydroelectric plan, through an increase in the …rm's pro…t ‡ow, and the value of the option to switch to the substitute renewable resource. Both the value functions before the switch and after the switch increase (the curves in Figure 2 shift upwards) . Thus, the …nal e¤ect on the timing to switch depends on which e¤ect is the strongest. Overall the e¤ect on …rm's pro…t seems to dominate. That means that when faced with a more e¢ cient renewable resource, the value function before the switch is lower than the value function after the switch, and hence the dirty …rm will decide to hasten the adoption of the substitute renewable resource.
Finally, Figure 8 shows the relation between the critical switching threshold X and the elasticity of market demand . We consider values of the elasticity of market demand ranging from about 0 to 0:6: The critical switching threshold is upward sloping with respect to : The intuition is as follows. The elasticity of demand is the same at every point along a constant elasticity demand curve. A perfectly inelastic demand curve, where = 0 everywhere, is a vertical straight line. A larger means that the market demand is ‡atter (more responsive to price changes) than the inelastic demand curves. As expected, a larger would reduce the pro…ts of both the dirty …rm and the clean …rm, since the market power of the energy producer reduces. The e¤ects on the option to switch is more ambiguous. On one hand, the value of the option to switch decreases because there is less incentive to switch to a renewable resource when the pro…ts of using that resource decrease (both the value function before the switch and the value function after the switch decrease); on the other hand, there is more incentive to switch to a renewable resource since the pro…ts of using a non-renewable resource decrease (hence, the value function before the switch increases). Thus, the …nal e¤ect on the timing to switch depends on which e¤ect is the strongest. Overall, the e¤ect on the green …rm seems to dominate. That means that when faced with a more elastic demand for electricity, the value of continuation is greater than the value of termination, and hence the producer will decide to wait longer for adopting the more environmental friendly renewable technology.
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
Conclusion
It is well known that in the debate about environmental policy intervention either an immediate government action is prescribed (Stern, 2007) or a more gradualist approach is suggested (Nordhaus, 2007) to contrast and control emissions and climate change. Our paper gives some indication on the optimal timing of switching and the types of policies that can implement environmental regulation, encouraging alternative sustainable energy services. We consider a model of switching from non-renewable and dirty resources to renewable and less polluting energy sources. It is found (Proposition 3) that the option to switch will be exercised, depending on values of the unit abatement cost and on the relative productivity parameter. The optimal switching time is sensitive to emission taxes, abatement costs, demand elasticity -whose increases slow down the adoption of substitutable renewable resources -and the natural rate of resource regeneration, the stock of renewable resources, the relative productivity parameter -whose increases speed up the investment in the green technology. These results have some implications for environmental policy. The government may want to accelerate the switching to a less polluting and renewable energy source. Then, it should provide subsidies to decrease the cost of investment in the green technology and to increase the productivity of renewable resources. Our framework illustrates also the e¤ects of exhaustibility of resources on the structure of optimal policy. Timing is crucial in policy intervention too: indeed, delaying intervention is costly, not only because of the resulting continued environment degradation, but also because it may widen the gap between dirty and clean technologies. Some extensions and further directions of research might be fruitful. One is to incorporate environmental risk, either modelling uncertainty in the regeneration rate or in the future costs of environmental damage. Deep structural uncertainty could be modelled by fat tailed distributions or multiple priors. Another extension is to study alternative mix of policies and the impact of di¤erent types of environmental regulation on the timing and direction of innovation in the energy sector. Finally, the possibility of reversible switching and of gradual transition toward a clean renewable backstop can be considered.
[39] Taschini, L., S. Urech, 2010. The real option to fuel switch in the presence of expected windfall pro…ts under the EU Emission Trading Scheme. The Journal of Energy Markets 3, 27-47.
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Appendix
* Optimal extraction rate and resource dynamics in the absence of pollution emissions, emission taxes and production costs.
In the absence of pollution emissions (i.e., = 0), emission taxes (i.e. = 0) and production costs, the marginal revenue of the …rm will grow with the interest rate. Thus:
If the demand shift parameter has a deterministic dynamics, dX t = X t dt and the resource depletion R 1;t = q 1;t dt we have (1 )a 1 1
Hence,
The solution of Eq. (2) is:
Since:
, straightforward calculations yield:
We can compute the remaining reserves of fossil fuel at any time t dR 1;t = q 1;t dt = r R 1;t dt =) R 1;t = R 1;0 e r t :
* Proof of Proposition 1
We follow Pindyck (1980) and de…ne the optimal value function as:
The fundamental equation of optimality for the producer of energy is:
where
We use the label "dirty-…rm" to indicate the …rm producing energy with a non-renewable resource input. The rate of return consists of the instantaneous pro…t ‡ow 1 (X; E) plus the expected change in the value of the dirty …rm. Optimality requires that the total expected return of the dirty …rm equals the required return r. To calculate the expected change in the value of the dirty …rm, Ed (V ), we apply Ito's Lemma to obtain:
Substituting (2) and (3) in (8) and recognizing that E(dZ) = (dt) 2 = (dt)(dZ) = 0, we get the expected change in the value of the "dirty …rm" over the time interval dt
Hence:
1 and the subscripts denote partial derivatives i.e., V R1 = @V / @R 1 , V X = @V / @X etc. This equation contains two state variables X and R 1 and it seems hard to …nd out a closed form solution. Nonetheless, this expression can be simpli…ed. First, we calculate the amount of emissions used as a function of the extraction rate 1 (q 1 ). Hence:
where = 1 (1 ), (0 < < 1) :
It is useful to rewrite Eq. (9) as:
The …rst order conditions (FOC) for the problem (11) is:
The marginal value function V R1 equals the incremental pro…t that can be obtained by extracting, processing and selling one unit of the non-renewable resource as energy.
To get the optimal extraction rate, we eliminate V from the problem (11). First, we di¤erentiate Eq. (11) with respect to R 1 ; we obtain:
Note that
= 0: Now using Ito's Lemma Eq. (13) can be rewritten as:
Applying the Ito's di¤erential operator (1=dt) Ed ( ) to both side of Eq. (12) we obtain:
Hence, we can combine equations (14) and (15) to obtain:
which is the stochastic version of the Euler equation. Substituting the expression for 1 (X; E ( 1 (q 1 ))) ; we have:
Hence, di¤erentiating the left-hand side of the equation above with respect to X and q 1 and after straightforward calculations we …nally arrive at:
Since
, it is easy to show that:
Finally, we can compute the remaining reserves of fossil fuel at any time t :
Substituting the optimal extraction rate (16) into (10) we …nd the optimal level of emissions:
while the …rm's pro…t is X 
This allows us to rewrite Eq. (11) as:
is the operating pro…t that can be obtained from an additional unit of the non-renewable resource extracted, processed and sold as energy.
* Proof of Proposition 2
We follow the same argument as in the previous section and de…ne the optimal value function as:
The fundamental value of the …rm satis…es the following Bellman equation (we suppress time subscripts unless they are needed for clarity):
where E = ( 2 ) (a 2 q 2 )
1
. We use the label "green-…rm" to indicate the …rm producing energy with a renewable resource. As before:
is the expected change in the value of the "green-…rm" over the time interval dt: Hence, the fundamental equation of optimality is:
First, we calculate the amount of emissions used as a function of the extraction rate. Straightforward calculations yield:
It is useful to rewrite Eq. (18) as:
where the instantaneous pro…t ‡ow 2 (X;
The FOC for the problem (20) is:
The marginal value function W R2 equals the incremental pro…t that can be obtained by extracting, processing and selling one unit of the renewable resource as energy. Di¤erentiating Eq. (18) with respect to R 2 yields:
Again @ 2(X;E( 2 (q2))) @R2 = 0: Now using Ito's Lemma we can rewrite Eq. (22) as follows:
Applying the Ito's di¤erential operator (1=dt) E t d ( ) to both side of Eq. (21) we have:
Hence, we can combine equations (23) and (24) to obtain:
, a simple substitution into the above equation yields:
Di¤erentiating the left-hand side of the equation above with respect to X and q 2 and after straightforward calculations we obtain:
De…ne the function, f (R 2;t ; t) = R 2;t e t and di¤erentiate this with respect to R 2;t and t: We get: df (R 2;t ; t) = e t dR 2;t R 2;t e t dt;
by substituting Eq. (4) into the above expression we obtain:
df (R 2;t ; t) = q 2;t e t dt:
Integrating from 0 to t we get: A straightforward calculation leads to the following expression of the optimal extraction rate:
Finally, we can compute the level of remaining stock of renewable resource at any time t : dR 2;t = ( R 2;t q 2 ) dt = r R 2;t dt =) R 2;t = R 2;0 e r t :
Substituting the optimal extraction rate (25) into (19) we …nd the optimal level of emissions: is the operating pro…t that can be obtained from an additional unit of the renewable resource extracted, processed and sold as energy.
* Proof of Proposition 3
Let V = J N (X; R 1 ) denote the value function for the "no-switching" region 0 t < , in which (X t ; E t ) = 1 (X t ; E t ( 1 (q 1 )) ). Substituting J N (X; R 1 ) for V into (17) we …nd that the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman di¤erential equation is:
It has the following general solution: 
@J N (X; R 1 )
and lim
Here,X is a free boundary, which must be found as part of the solution, and which separates the switching from the no-switching regions. It is also the solution to the stopping problem (7):
The renewable resource should be adopted the …rst time the process X t crosses the thresholdX from below. Boundary condition (27) re ‡ects the fact that if X t is ever zero, it will remain at zero thereafter. Condition (28) is the value matching condition which says that the value function of the dirty …rm at the time of switching is equal to the payo¤ from adopting the renewable input (which is equal to the value function of the green …rm minus the installment cost of the green farm). In addition, to ensure that renewable resource adoption occurs along the optimal path, the value function satis…es the smooth-pasting condition (29) at the endogenous adoption threshold (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994 ) and the smooth-pasting condition (30) which is the tangency condition of the derivative of the value function with a non-renewable resource with respect to the stock of non-renewable resource (marginal value function) and the derivative of the value function with a renewable resource with respect to the stock of renewable resource. Finally, Eq. (31) is the transversality condition. It implies that if the initial stock of non-renewable resource is in…nite, the …rm does not care about having the renewable resource as an input substitute in production. In our problem boundary condition (27) implies that 2 = 0 leaving the solution:
The value matching condition (28) can be rearranged in the following manner: 
The smooth-pasting condition (29) yields: Moreover, the smooth-pasting condition (30) yields:
(34) is the critical level of the non-renewable resource at which the marginal value function with a non-renewable resource is equal to the marginal value function with a renewable resource. Any additional units of the non-renewable resource extracted, processed and sold as energy will make the marginal value function of a dirty …rm lower than that of a clean …rm. 32 The reason is that an additional unit of resource extracted, processed and sold as energy will increase the event of exhaustion of the non-renewable resource. Hence, c R 1 can also be interpreted as the critical level of the stock of non-renewable resource which makes the decision to switch to a substitute renewable resource optimal. Finally, notice that we evaluate the optimal switching time and the option to switch at the critical level c R 1 which means that their values are driven only by the other economic factors.
Plugging (34) into (33), we get the expression:
(a 2 q 2;0 )
Plugging (35) into (32), we get the expression:
( 1 1 
The value of the option to switch is de…ned by the exponential term 1 X 1 0 ; so that a simple substitution of (37) 
